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This paper presents a theory of underdevelopment. It explains why de-
veloping countries may not be able to successfully implement the productive
technologies or modes of organization used in developed ones. It also sug-
gests ways around this problem of implementation, and provides an expla-
nation for why already developed countries did not face the same problems.
The paper examines the interaction between the population’s work ethic
and the actions of …rms, where a person’s work ethic comes to matter. It
i ss h o w nt h a ta ne c o n o m yc a nb ei ne i t h e rah i g hw o r ke t h i cs t e a d ys t a t e ,
or a welfare dominated low work ethic one. Development makes the high
work ethic steady state more e¢cient, but, if too rapid, will not allow it to
be reached. Instead, the unique trajectory is to the low one, and welfare is
reduced.
¤We would like to thank Lans Bovenberg, Harald Uhlig, Ashok Kotwal, Andrea Prat
and seminar participants at the Australian National University, Melbourne, Sydney,
Queen’s, Bocconi and Tilburg Universities, for helpful comments and suggestions. We
are especially grateful to Siwan Anderson, Jan Boone and Huw-Lloyd Ellis for extensive
comments.
11I n t r o d u c t i o n
A central task of development economics is to explain the huge di¤erences
in income levels and di¤erences in growth rates between the developed West
and underdeveloped countries. The recent literature investigating the de-
terminants of these di¤erences overwhelmingly supports the conclusion that
they are not due to cross-country variations in the level of inputs, but, in-
stead, are largely caused by di¤erences in technology.1 But why is it the case
that some developing countries are unable to successfully implement the pro-
ductive technologies or modes of organization used in developed ones, when
such improvements (if not the state of the art) are apparently freely ob-
servable, and available? Conversely, what was it about other relatively late
developers, those in East-Asia in particular, that allowed them to implement
these modes and technology in their rapid catch-up with the West?
These questions are examined in this paper which presents a model that
explains why developing countries may not be successful in implementing the
productive technologies, or modes of organization used in developed ones. At
the same time, it suggests ways around this problem of implementation, and
provides an explanation for why already developed countries did not face the
same problems. It also suggests reasons for why some countries may have
been able to overcome these di¢culties. The explanation presented here
attributes a prominent role to a population’s work ethic.2
Generally, notions like work ethics are seen as beyond the purview of
economics, and for good reason. Attributing underdevelopment to a poor
work ethic, which is treated as an exogenous endowment, is more a re-
labelling than an explanation and provides little insight. Here, in contrast,
a population’s work ethic endogenously evolves, albeit slowly, in response
to economic incentives: the prevalence of a work ethic rises if it receives
economic reward and falls if it is not rewarded.3
1This is the conclusion reached in: King and Levine (1994), Klenow and Rodriguez-
Clare (1997), Prescott (1998), and Hall and Jones (1999).
2The term “work ethic” is most often associated with Max Weber (1905). He linked
it with Protestantism, and argued it played a central role in explaining the comparatively
advanced development of Northern Europe. Though he presented little evidence for it, a
body of research in contemporary psychometrics documents its prevalence and analyzes
cross-country variations, for a review see Furnham (1990). Also, many contemporary
writers on development have evoked it in a Confucian guise, as an explanatory variable in
successful South East Asian development (see Kunio 1994).
3For recent examples of evolutionary approaches to characteristics and preferences see
Nyberg (1997), Lindbeck, Nyberg and Weibull (1998) and Fershtman and Weiss (1998).
Many social scientist have argued the importance of other non-rational elements, like
culture, in understanding economic di¤erences. For example, Landes (1998) argues it to
be a critical factor in explaining cross-country experiences. Ostrom (1990) emphasizes
such considerations in explaining why societies can sometimes solve free-rider problems
arising from unlimited access to natural resources. Another example is the term “social
capital”, used by Putnam (1993) to describe regional di¤erences in Italian civic attitudes in
explaining why di¤erent regions varied in their implementation of administrative reform.
2Speci…cally, a good work ethic lowers the disutility of exerting e¤ort for
work. Although potential employers cannot observe an individual’s work
ethic directly, they may infer it from that person’s work history. Whether
this is possible depends on the availability of work opportunities for workers
with no previous work history. We assume that, in all jobs, work e¤ort is
inherently non-supervisable and non-contractible. Moreover, all workers can
directly bene…t by shirking, but these bene…ts will be higher for individuals
without a work ethic. This means that when a worker’s previous work
history has been good, a positive signal is obtained about the worker’s ethic.
Thus …rms that hire young workers, about whom there is no previous work
history to consult, perform a valuable screening role, and thereby generate
a form of informational externality.4
However …rms’ incentives to hire workers about whom there is no previ-
ous work history depend on the perceived characteristics of the workforce:
if workers are known, in general, to have a good work ethic, this inclines
…rms’ towards hiring workers without a history. If, however, workers in the
economy are reputed to be poor in work ethic, …rms will prefer not to risk
hiring them.
Dependence also runs in the other direction. We assume here that hav-
ing a work ethic is never su¢ciently useful to be its own reward. If it were
that useful then a work ethic would simply evolve into the population, inde-
pendently of the interaction occuring between workers and …rms, because it
would always be a useful characteristic. Here, in contrast, to obtain rewards
to a work ethic, it is necessary that it be revealed. But this cannot happen
if …rms are not willing to risk hiring workers. In that case, a population’s
work ethic will be poor. Conversely, if many …rms that are willing to hire
workers without a work history exist, workers stand a good chance of having
their work ethic revealed, and rewarded, and a work ethic will ‡ourish.
This mutual interdependence between work ethics and …rms can give
rise to a multiplicity of steady states. A prevalence of good work ethic types
together with a large number of …rms willing to hire the young, is mutually
reinforcing and can constitute a steady state. Similarly a steady state also
exists in which a bad work ethic is widespread, and …rms prefer not to risk
hiring workers about whom there is no information.
However, these steady states are not equivalent in their e¢ciency proper-
ties. In the steady state where there are many …rms and good work ethics are
revealed, there is an identi…ed pool of good workers who can be pro…tably
employed even when narrow monetary or reputational incentives are not
able to ameliorate agency problems arising for those without work ethics.
This can lead to e¢ciency gains the size of which depend on the magni-
tude of the economy’s agency problems. Noe and Rebello (1994) argue that
4The value of this informational externality depends on a form of “single crossing
property” holding; the precise condition is established in the paper.
3in already developed economies these problems are widespread since it is
commonplace for management to be insu¢ciently disciplined by …nancial
incentives. Their paper explores the implications of “managerial ethics”
in mitigating these problems.5 In LDCs, where contracts and enforcement
are less well established, such agency concerns are likely to be even more
important.
Our primary concern here is with how such a socially valuable charac-
teristic interacts with the process of development in an LDC.6 We posit the
development process as the implementation of better technological, institu-
tional and/or organizational processes. Importantly, these processes and/or
technologies are assumed to be ability intensive, so that, initially at least,
most of the productivity gain is to the high “ability” individuals. This could
be an inherent characteristic of the new technologies used or alternatively,
it would occur if “development” involves the freeing up of markets and more
accurate matching of factor rewards with marginal products.7
Although ability is independent of work ethics, being revealed as pos-
sessing a good work ethic is more valuable to an individual with high ability
than to one with low, due to their higher productivity. When setting wages
to induce e¤ort, …rms take this into account and could pay the high ability
workers lower wages. But this may not be optimal for …rms if they cannot
observe ability types, since low wages would induce the low ability to shirk.
If there are too many low ability types, ability di¤erences are small enough,
or shirking is too costly, …rms will prefer a high wage strategy.
Under a high wage strategy, the high types obtain an ability/informational
rent and in a world where there are insu¢cient intrinsic motives for devel-
oping a work ethic, such rents provide the only incentives for a work ethic
to emerge.8
5Noe and Rebello (1994) similarly consider the e¤ects of an economy wide character-
istic, “managerial ethics” on choices of technology. However, an important distinction
between their work and the present paper is that they allow for no means by which indi-
viduals’ ethics can be revealed. We discuss the precise distinctions further after presenting
our own results.
6It may be tempting to posit the multiplicity of equilibria here as a metaphor for
underdevelopment due to a development trap. This would correspond to the developed
having many …rms and a high work ethic, while the underdeveloped have fewer …rms and
a work ethic languishes. The present analysis is more ambitious than that. Simply la-
belling one equilibrium that of the developed economy and the other the underdeveloped
provides no explanation for why di¤ering economies developed as they did, but instead
attributes all of the explanation to features that are outside the model (initial conditions).
Here, in contrast, successes and failures share identical initial conditions and our analysis
focuses instead on the transition process that accompanies the introduction of produc-
tivity improving technologies. It is the way in which new technologies and/or modes of
organization are introduced that either encourages the right dynamic adjustment paths
(development successes) or the wrong ones (failures), as will be seen.
7If the development process is not ability intensive then development will always suc-
ceed in our framework, we discuss this further after the main results.
8The general point here is that the high ability receive a higher rent when …rms wish to
4Now consider how this situation is a¤ected by the introduction of ability
intensive technologies or institutional changes. Initially, since this causes the
informational rents enjoyed by the high types to rise, …rms may choose to
decrease their wages in order to extract these high rents. The cost of doing
this is that, at these lower wages, the low ability types will shirk. However,
if the relative gains of the high types are large enough, cost savings from
reduced wages o¤set extra shirking costs, and …rms change from the high to
a low wage strategy.
This endogenous response of …rms to attempted development determines
whether development is a success or not. If …rms do change to a low wage
strategy, then the economy unambiguously converges to a steady state where
all workers and …rms are STRICTLY worse o¤ than they were in the pre-
development steady state. This is true even though the new technologies
and/or institutions give rise to a new “development” steady state which
Pareto dominates the pre-development one and which is itself a stable steady
state. The reason all are worse o¤ is that this new steady state is never
reached when …rms follow the low wage strategy.
The intuition for this is as follows. When …rms …nd it optimal to provide
performance incentives for those with low ability, (i.e., under the high wage
strategy) then, because contracts are designed to induce e¤ort from the
low types, who cannot initially be distinguished from the high types, the
high ability receive an informational rent. This rent provides evolutionary
incentives for the maintenance of a work ethic.9 Development that causes
too large an increase in the relative returns of the high types may render it
optimal for …rms to ignore the low types altogether. If …rms then provide
incentives that are explicitly targeted at the high types only, the high types
stop receiving an informational rent, and evolutionary incentives for the
creation of work ethics are destroyed. Eventually, the population’s work
ethic disappears as the economy converges to the bad steady state.
Paradoxically then, the attempt to implement the more productive West-
ern technologies not only fails in itself, but also moves the economy to a lower
welfare level than before the technologies were available, by destroying any
initially existing work ethics.
The outcome is di¤erent if …rms persist with a high wage strategy along
induce e¤ort from the low types too. If …rms care only about inducing the high type, they
can adjust wages so that the high type receive none of the rent. This feature corresponds
to the ability/informational rents which occur in standard principal agent models with
adverse selection, and is well known to be robust to extension, see Salanie (1997) for a
treatment of this.
9This rent plays a similar role to the payments old individuals receive from the young in
the rational cultural bubble of Cozzi (1998). Like a work ethic in our framework, culture
in his model is valuable in production but cannot be directly rewarded in the market. In
his model it is rewarded by the payments of the young to the old, in ours it is rewarded
as an ability/informational rent to the high ability types. His model is discussed further
in the …nal section.
5the development path. In that case, since …rms wish to include both the
low and the high ability types in production, evolutionary incentives for the
maintenance of a work ethic persist, and development succeeds. That is, the
economy unambiguously converges to the new “development” steady state,
and all are better o¤.
Thus, successful development depends critically on the size of the initial
change in productivity of the high type relative to the low when development
is attempted. If the magnitude of this change is too large, the economy’s
only trajectory becomes the path to the low level equilibrium. Another
implication is that, for any development failure, there always exists a con-
vex combination of small intermediate steps which ensures a development
success. Small changes lower the magnitude of the initial increase in rents
to high ability types, preventing the …rms from switching to the low wage.
This preserves evolutionary incentives for the development of work ethics,
so that eventually more people acquire good work ethics. At that point, the
economy is ready for another step in the sequence, and so on, until all the
changes have been introduced.
This points to a possible reason for why development was successful in
the West but may not be readily emulated in follower countries. Slow change
was a condition imposed on the West by the fact that new technologies and
institutions had to be “home-grown”. This contrasts with the potential for
rapid change which has accompanied the implementation of such “o¤-the-
shelf” Western technologies and institutions in LDCs over the second half
of this century.
However, this does not imply that the optimal policy for LDCs is to
follow the West’s lead and use only home-grown technologies. Development
can still be a success there provided returns to the high ability do not out-
strip those of the low ability by too much. That is, provided that even the
low ability are induced to participate in the development process. A simple
policy to achieve this is a tax on the high ability, and transfer to the low, i.e.
increased progressivity in the tax scheme. This also has a positive implica-
tion. To the extent that our model captures all the relevant features of the
real world, the theory predicts that development is more likely to succeed,
ceteris paribus, the tighter the dispersion in earnings, or the lower the in-
equality that is induced by the development changes. Regional comparisons,
which are brie‡y reviewed in a later section, are well known to be consistent
with this prediction.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 sets up the model, Section 3
analyses the model, determining steady states, dynamics and welfare, and
Section 4 derives the main results. A brief conclusion is provided in Section
5.
62T h e M o d e l
The economy comprises measure 2 of individuals at all times. Measure
1 of individuals is born in every period and each individual lives for two
periods (young and old). There is free entry of …rms. Each …rm requires
one unskilled worker (where young individuals will be employed) and one
manager (for old individuals). Firms live for one period only.10 Firms can
be ordered according to their entry costs which are denoted Ei for …rm i;
and are drawn from a distribution E (density e); which is continuous and
strictly positive in the interior, and has supports [E;1); with E ¸ 0: Firms
incur this cost when entering. Both …rms and individuals are risk neutral and
there is no discounting. If not working, individuals receive utility normalized
to zero each period of their lives, which is also the opportunity cost of entry
to a …rm.
All values in the model are expressed in the utility metric.
A worker’s work ethic is determined before knowing their ability by na-
ture (described below), and ability is revealed to a worker before period 1
of life. In period 1, young workers are unskilled and they either work at a
…rm or are unemployed. The output of unskilled work in period 1 is ob-
served by all …rms, together with the abilities of all workers.11 In period 2,
old individuals are either employed as managers or unemployed, after which
they die. The sequence of events in each individual’s life is summarized as
follows:
Birth Young Old
Nature ability unskilled output and manager
chooses revealed work or ability or
ethic to worker unemployed observed unemployed
2.1 Work ethics
Individuals either have a “good”, g; or a “bad”, b; work ethic which cannot
change, and this a¤ects their cost of e¤ort provision. In particular:
e ¤ o r tc o s t=
½
0 for g types
±>0; for b types.
A work ethic is inculcated at an early age (most realistically by parents, but
we remain agnostic about the source) and requires an initial utility cost, F;
10The model’s steady states are qualitatively unchanged if …rms are allowed to live for
an arbitrary number of periods. They could even be in…nitely lived, as long as discounting
is introduced.
11Identical results obtain if ability is non-observable.
7to obtain.12
An individual’s own work ethic is private information.
2.2 Ability
Ability is entirely exogenous and is revealed to individuals after nature has
determined their work ethic, and to all …rms only after the …rst period
of an individual’s employment.13 The distribution of ability types in the
population is binary:
proportion µ are low ability
proportion 1 ¡ µ are high ability.
Ability in‡uences the level of skills a worker accumulates when young. The
skill level will, in turn, determine the worker’s productivity in some tasks
when old. The details are spelled out in section 2.4 below.
2.3 Working when young
As discussed in the introduction, there are bene…ts to shirking which can not
be ameliorated either by contract or by direct supervision. We assume that
employers can condition payment on output, but there is limited liability so
that in the event of insu¢cient output, the maximal penalty is zero payment.
The worker chooses to either work (contribute e¤ort) or shirk (no e¤ort).
If working, output of value Y is produced. If shirking, output =0and the
…rm loses z which the shirking worker obtains herself. If w denotes wages
paid, these possibilities are summarized as follows:
…rm receives worker receives e¤ort cost
worker works Y ¡ w w 0 for g type;±for b type
worker shirks ¡z z 0 for both types
12This cost can be thought of as the cost of disciplining at an early age (again this is
probably a cost also borne by parents but we will render this internal to the individual).
We favour the …xed learning cost interpretation of F here, but this is not necessary. F
could also arise if having a work ethic were costly in other ways, for instance, if other
individuals took advantage of those agents. Our approach here has been to short cut
much of the complexity of a realistic account of social evolution by internalizing all of
the costs and bene…ts of a “type” to the individual. In reality, parents bear large costs
too. However, the pattern of evolution will be qualitatively identical provided they make
decisions based on some combination of their children’s and their own welfare. As Bowles
(1998) has argued in his survey of work on endogenous preferences, it is erroneous to con-
sider preference formation as an individual choice in the usual economic sense of choosing
actions. Preferences instead are learned or acquired by processes which may not be inten-
tional. Once learned however, they then become generalized reasons for behavior outside
the situation in which they were formed. We embed these considerations into the type
choice, or investment cost, F; which is dictated by a replicator dynamic that takes account
of individual bene…ts accruing to a work ethic, to be made explicit subsequently.
13The converse assumption, that ability remains private information, yields identical
results.
8Shirking is thus an activity like slacking on the job, or using the com-
pany’s capital and good name for one’s own bene…t.14 Even though, for
g workers, e¤ort costs nothing, shirking may still be attractive since it al-
lows the possibility of obtaining z:15 Recall that the total number of …rms
is endogenously determined and is denoted as °:
2.4 Working when old
Each …rm needs one old worker in a managerial position. The productivity
of old workers is independent of the …rm’s young workers. Management
requires e¤ort and again allows a potential gain to shirking. E¤ort required
is identical to that required when young, i.e., 0 for g,a n d± for b types. If
e¤ort is provided, output depends on the manager’s skills developed during
the …rst period, which, in turn, depend on the individual’s ability. A high
ability type produces output valued at H(°) as a manager. H(:) is assumed
to be a decreasing function, which is meant to capture the fact that training
as a manager is ability intensive, but the higher is the number of …rms hiring
young workers, the less e¢cient is the training process of young workers.16
The low ability type produces a lower value of output denoted L,w h e r e
L · H(°).17
If shirking, either type receives a bene…t of ">0; where "<L :But
we assume management is more vital to the …rms than unskilled labour;
the cost imposed on the …rm when a manager shirks is an amount k !1 :
Contracting is the same as for the young, i.e. output conditioned wages can
be paid but there is limited liability, so that wages are non-negative. This
implies that …rms will avoid hiring a shirking manager at all costs.18 If the
14The critical feature of this environment is that shirking provides some bene…t to
the employee and that it imposes some costs on the …rm, which is ensured by the limited
liability assumption. That the workers’ bene…ts and …rms’ costs of shirking are equivalent,
as in the current formulation, is not necessary for the results to follow, though it does serve
to make the model simpler.
15To make the model more general, one could also assume that a worker with good work
ethic bene…ts from shirking less than a worker with bad work ethics. A simple way to
model this would be to assume that the bene…t from shirking to a worker with good work
ethic is ®z; where ® 2 (0;1): This would not change any of our results qualitatively.
16F o re x a m p l e ,t h et r a i n i n gp r o c e s sm a yr e q u i r es o m es c a r c er e s o u r c ec o m m o nt oa l l
…rms using the same technology. Then a high number of …rms using the technology means
that the price of this resource is high, which makes the training process costly and therefore
less training is provided by each …rm. This assumption is stricter than necessary. It is
not necessary that H(:) is monotonic, but we will assume it is in order to simplify the
analysis.
17At the cost of complicating the exposition, it would be possible to allow L to be a
function of ° too. This is without qualitative e¤ect provided the assumption that training
is ability intensive is preserved. Thus it is necessary that the di¤erence in productivity
between high and low ability workers falls as the amount of training increases.
18This assumption could be relaxed at some cost to the ease of exposition. If k were
bounded, the only change would be a decrease in the equilibrium number of workers who
9m a n a g e r ’ sw a g ei sd e n o t e dw(i); where i = H; L; or 0 denotes the three
possible outputs, the possibilities can again be summarized in a table:
…rm receives worker receives e¤ort cost
high ability manager works H ¡ w(H) w(H) 0 for g type;±for b type
low ability manager works L ¡ w(L) w(L) 0 for g type, ± for b type
manager shirks ¡k " 0 for both types
Productivity of an old individual who was unemployed in the …rst period
is zero in any managerial position. Individuals who do not work as managers
when old will be unemployed.
2.5 Dynamics
Firms adjust instantaneously according to expected pro…t from using each
technology, but individual types do so slowly. The critical state variables
are the proportion (or measure) of individuals choosing to develop a work
ethic, ¯; and the measure of …rms that enter which we denote °.
Assume population types adjust gradually according to a replicator dy-











where the function © is increasing and E[ui] denotes the expected lifetime
utility of a worker with a good (i = g) or bad (i = b) work ethic.19 There
are numerous stories which could be evoked to justify the work ethic’s ad-
justment via a replicator dynamic. One story would be that parents choose
the type of values to inculcate into their children based on the expected
returns of those values. Thus, at a cost, F, parents can make their children
“enjoy” work, so that the e¤ort cost of work when they are older is low.
According to the dynamic above, parents will be more likely to choose this
acquire a work ethic. The source of k is not explicitly modelled but it is meant to corre-
spond to situations where employers cannot safeguard against the actions of bad managers
and will therefore only produce when they can “trust” them. We have in mind, in partic-
ular, situations where managers have important responsibilities whose timely execution is
vital to the …rm. Some examples are where a manager is responsible for decision making
related to production and input choices, or where there is sensitive equipment that must
be maintained and properly used. Once again, the delays in inferring irresponsible be-
haviour, and the limited liability when that occurs, make …rms wary of hiring the wrong
types.
19We take the simplest form of replicator, without drift, since we are not interested
in issues of equilibrium selection, apart from the standard ruling out of locally unstable
equilibria. For a general discussion of equilibrium selection and analysis with stochastic
components see Samuelson’s (1997) lucid exposition. We could alternatively have speci…ed
© to be fully backward looking, i.e. as a function of previous periods average returns to
each type rather than expected returns, without a¤ecting any results.
10when it yields bene…ts, since the extra future returns to having a work ethic
must justify the costs incurred when young. But, importantly, the replicator
implies that when returns change, not all individuals immediately switch.
There are, once again, a number of reasons that could be used to support
this assumption: di¤usion e¤ects, underlying time-varying heterogeneity in
adjustment costs or age di¤erences and inertia. We do not explicitly tie the
model to any of these as the precise form is of no consequence.20
The adjustment of …rms, in contrast, is immediate; that is, ° is a jump
variable. Letting ¼(t) denote the expected pro…t of a …rm from hiring a
young worker in period t.21 The behaviour of ° (t) is as follows:





xjE(xj)dj = ° (t)
and ¼(t)=Ei (3)
The conditions above are simply the implications of assuming free and
immediate entry on the part of …rms. Condition (2) says that the measure of
…rms entering equals zero when operating pro…ts are insu¢cient to cover the
…xed costs of even the least costly …rm. Condition (3) says that if operating
pro…ts are high enough to cover …xed costs for some …rms, the number of
…rms entering in period t, ° (t); will be such that expected operating pro…ts
just cover …xed costs of entry for the marginal …rm.
20One can also interpret such an evolutionary dynamic in a more strictly biological
sense, as arising when those with higher economic rewards are “…tter”, more able to
attract mates, and thus more able to leave behind surviving progeny. For more on the
underpinnings evoked to explain a replicator dynamic see Ben Ner and Putterman (1998,
Ch. 1). For some readers, an evolutionary approach to the work ethic is controversial.
Its importance in our framework, however, stems only from the slow adjustment, relative
to …rms, which it implies. We could also think of the work ethic as a consciously chosen
variable, and all results would persist provided, at the aggregate level, changes in this
variable occurred slower than they do for …rms. We discuss this further after the main
results. Some readers will also be bothered by the coexistence of fully rational …rms and
a replicator dynamic which drives the choices of individuals. Apart from the replicator
not being essential to the results here, we think this modelling choice is sensible for the
same reasons that others have used it before, for examples see Ho­er (1999) and von
Thadden (1992). The choice of what sort of work ethic to acquire is a fundamentally
di¤erent choice to the choice of mode of production to employ in a …rm. We believe the
former is much more likely to be subject to inertia, e.g. from one’s background and the
practices of one’s parents, than is the latter, where best practices should be implemented
much more rapidly. The replicator is a reduced form way of modelling this.
21It will be seen that hiring old workers never generates positive pro…t in equilibrium,
so we ignore it without loss of generality here.
112.6 Parameter restrictions
We restrict parameters in order to focus on situations where interior equilib-
ria (both ethical types) have a possibility of occurring. Given the amount of
heterogeneity (both ability and ethics) in the model, these restrictions are
considerably more complicated than the usual Inada conditions, so that we
explain each in turn.




E xe(x)dx =1 ;E i <Y+ L ¡ z
This says that if all individuals have a good work ethic, then full em-
ployment is feasible. The value of output produced when young Y; plus
the increased productivity a low type obtains due to training, L,n e to ft h e
bene…t they could obtain due to shirking, z, exceed the …xed costs of entry
even if enough …rms enter to guarantee full employment. If no individuals
have a good work ethic, then since E ¸ 0; it is also the case that there can
be no employment.
Assumption 2: Diminishing returns to ability intensive training
(i) H (1) = L;
(ii) H0(0) = 0; H0(z) < 0 for all z>0; and
(iii) H00(:) < 0:
Assumption 2, part (i), captures the ability intensity of training in an
extreme way: it ensures that if all individuals have the opportunity to be
trained, training is so poor that high ability individuals have no more pro-
ductivity than the low. Parts (ii) and (iii) have natural interpretations: the
marginal product of high ability managers is declining in the number of
them trained, and at an increasing rate.
Assumption 3: Shirking is attractive
(i) z>H (0):
(ii) ±>maxfH(0) ¡ ";Y + " ¡ zg:
If the bene…ts of shirking were so low that an individual’s deferred bene…t
to being revealed as having a good ethic exceeded the bene…t of shirking,
then wages would be negative and shirking would not be a problem. Part
(i) in Assumption 3 guarantees that shirking is attractive enough to make
it a problem to …rms and restricts wages to be positive. Part (ii) assumes
12it is not e¢cient to elicit e¤ort from workers with bad work ethics either
as workers or as managers: By assuming the cost of e¤ort, ±,i sh i g hf o r
these types, we ensure that separation can occur between those with and
without work ethics. This is analogous to a single crossing assumption for
this binary production function.
3A n a l y s i s
3.1 Job assignment and wages of old workers
The restrictions placed on the relative costs and bene…ts of e¤ort in each
mode of organization, and the potential for high losses to …rms, ensure …rms
will be wary of obtaining the wrong sorts of agents as managers. That is:
Lemma 1 (i) Workers revealed to have a good work ethic when young will
be assigned to management when old and will receive wages equal to L or
H; depending on their ability.
(ii) All the other workers who were not revealed to have good work ethic
w h e ny o u n gw i l lb eu n e m p l o y e d .
Proofs of this and all other results are in the appendix.
Workers who have been revealed as not having work ethics will never be
placed in management. The reason is that, due to limited liability and large
disutility of e¤ort, it is not pro…table to elicit e¤ort from these workers. If
placed in management they would therefore shirk and impose large costs on
the …rm, k. Firms thus never employ old workers with no work ethic: The
large cost k also implies they will not risk placing a worker about whose
work ethic they are unsure in a management position. Old workers will also
never be placed in unskilled jobs because, since they are in their last period
of life, they have no deferred bene…ts to being revealed as having a good
work ethic and are thus more costly to motivate than the young.
The wages of managers will be L or H; depending on their ability. The
reason is that the number of these managers is limited and …rms therefore
compete for them. Note also that this would be equivalently the case if
ability were not observed, since contracts would simply condition pay on
output produced, subject to the limited liability constraint. Finally, due to
competition between the …rms, whether a …rm employs a high or low ability
manager its pro…t from this manager is always zero.
3.2 Ethic revelation
When young, both abilities and types are private information, but a …rm’s
output, and the identity of its employee are common knowledge. In some
situations, this knowledge may indirectly reveal information about an em-
ployee’s type.
13Lemma 2 (i) If a young worker produces output of value Y , then it becomes
common knowledge that this worker has a good work ethic.
(ii) If a young worker produces output of value 0, then this worker may
not have a good work ethic.
Lemma 2 says that positive output perfectly reveals a worker with a
work ethic. This is because, at any feasible wages, i.e., w · Y; individuals
without a work ethic would always prefer to shirk, even if not shirking
ensures them management work: According to Lemma 1, then, non-shirking
workers will be assigned to management: In contrast, output of 0 suggests
some uncertainty as to the worker’s ethic.
3.3 Wages of young workers
Firstly note that if N<1; a …rm could always set its wage at an arbitrarily
low level and still induce participation. This would, however, not be pro…t
maximizing as there would be insu¢cient incentive for a worker accepting
such a wage to provide e¤ort. To calculate the pro…t maximizing wage it is
necessary to compute a …rm’s expected operating pro…t from hiring a young
worker conditional on the wage. This will depend on the distribution of
work ethics. If the probability of hiring a non-shirker is denoted p; a… r m
makes expected operating pro…t of:
¼ = p(Y ¡ w) ¡ (1 ¡ p)z; (4)
recalling that w is the wage paid by the …rm to non-shirkers under the
contract. It will be seen below that p is a¤ected by w:
To be viable, a …rm must o¤er a wage attracting at least some workers
with a good work ethic and inducing them to work. However, any feasible
(i.e., non-negative) wage will always attract bad workers too since these
individuals can bene…t by shirking. The pro…t maximizing wage for …rms
depends critically on the underlying ability distribution in the population,
and returns to ability when working as a manager. These considerations
imply:
Lemma 3 The pro…t maximizing wage for …rms to pay young workers is
w =
½
z ¡ L when H (°) · ^ H
z ¡ H (°) when H (°) > ^ H
; (5)
where ^ H ´ µY+L
1¡µ :
Note that the wage setting decision of a …rm is independent of its cost of
entry, Ei; since these costs are sunk: Wages for the young cannot fall to clear
the market in this framework, because they must also induce e¤ort. A …rm
14o¤ering a positive wage will thus always face an excess supply of workers
if N<1: However, there does not exist a wage that will be able to induce
e¤ort from workers with a bad work ethic. This is because such workers
would always shirk when put in a management position and receive ": From
Assumption 3 part (ii) this means these individuals are better o¤ shirking
even if the …rm were to promise them all of the output they produce when
young. Since a work ethic is not observable, …rms thus accept that they will,
with some probability, hire a shirker. They thus design wages to induce no
shirking in the event that they happen to hire a worker who has a good
work ethic. In doing this they face a trade-o¤: if they o¤er the lower wage,
z¡H (°); only individuals with high ability will exert the appropriate e¤ort,
all others will take the job and shirk. By paying a higher wage, z ¡L,b o t h
high and low ability individuals with work ethics will work (note that part (i)
of Assumption 3 immediately implies that this wage is positive). Equation
(5) describes the determinants of that decision: when returns to the high
ability are relatively large, …rms can induce e¤ort from these individuals
much more cheaply than they can from the low, thus making the low wage
strategy more attractive.
3.4 Interior equilibria
We …rst establish the existence of interior equilibria; those in which both
ethical types exist and there is entry of …rms. Since a work ethic is costly
to obtain, recall that F is incurred by those with a work ethic, an interior
equilibrium requires the existence of some economic rewards to it. In turn,
for this to happen, some …rms that hire young workers must make a non-
negative pro…t net of their entry costs. We …rst discuss necessary conditions
for both of these occurrences before formally describing interior equilibria.
The existence of economic rewards to a work ethic turns on the wages
paid to young workers. Suppose that these …rms paid the low wage in
equation (5), w = z ¡ H (°). Then even high ability individuals would
receive no return to having a work ethic, and one could never exist in an
equilibrium. To see this, suppose that a high ability individual does not
shirk and is indirectly revealed as having a work ethic. This person then
receives a payment of H (°) as a manager when old; however, this only yields
for them a combined two period utility of z; at the wage w = z ¡ H (°);
which is what they could have had without a work ethic by simply shirking
when young. That is, this is only as much as an individual without a work
ethic obtains if they …nd work. A person with low ability would be even
worse o¤. Consequently, returns to having a work ethic and not shirking
can only be positive if …rms pay young workers the high wage, that is, if
w = z¡L: However, from Lemma 3, a necessary and su¢cient condition for
15this to be the wage paid is
H (°) · ^ H: (6)
This is a plausible feature of our environment. Any cultural variable that
is costly to develop can only exist if it provides a reward. Since we assume
no direct utility bene…t to a work ethic (because individuals without one
can always shirk) this economic reward is an ability/informational rent to
the high types. Thus an interior equilibrium can only arise if (6) holds.
Otherwise, according to (5); the wage is equal to z¡H (°) and any individual
with a work ethic expects a lifetime utility that is lower (at least by F) than
the expected utility of individuals with no work ethic, so that ¯ would
converge to zero under the replicator dynamic.
Another necessary feature of an interior equilibrium is that the …rms
who allow work ethics to be indirectly revealed must obtain non-negative
pro…ts. At w = z ¡ L; it can be seen from (4) that this implies ¯(Y ¡ z +
L) ¡ (1 ¡ ¯)z ¸ E; since p = ¯ at this wage. Rearranging yields:




If this condition is violated, then even the lowest cost …rms would earn
negative expected pro…t and would choose not to operate. Note, however,
that values of ¯ satisfying the above condition always exist by Assumption
1:
We are now ready to establish necessary and su¢cient conditions for the
existence of a unique, stable, interior steady state.
Proposition 4 (i) If an interior equilibrium exists, i.e., 0 <¯<1; it
corresponds to a solution to the following conditions:
Ei = ¯ (Y + L) ¡ z (8)





(ii) Holding all other parameters …xed, there exist F¤ > 0 and Y ¤(F) ¸ 0
such that:
(a) If F>F ¤ no interior equilibrium exists.
(b) If F = F¤ and Y ¸ Y ¤(F) then there exists a unique interior equi-
librium (¯¤;°¤) with 0 <¯ ¤ < 1; 0 <° ¤ < 1. This equilibrium is unstable.
(c) If F<F ¤ and Y ¸ Y ¤(F) then there exist exactly two interior
equilibria, (¯¤
A;°¤
A)a n d( ¯¤
B;°¤
B), with 0 <¯ ¤
i < 1; 0 <° ¤
i < 1;i= A;B.
If ¯¤
i >¯ ¤
j;i ;j2f A;Bg;i6= j; and equilibrium i is stable while equilibrium
j is unstable.
16The necessity part of the proposition needs little explanation; to observe
positive entry of …rms and both work ethics in a steady state requires that
marginal …rms are indi¤erent to entering and having a work ethic is equiv-
alent, in expected utility, to not having one. Also condition (6) must hold,
which is also re‡ected in the …rm’s wage setting in equation (8): Su¢ciency
is less immediate. The …rst condition, that F cannot be too high, is in-
tuitively clear, since for too high values of F; economic rewards can never
justify nature’s choice of a work ethic. The existence of two interior steady
states for lower values of F, A and B in Figure 1, follows from counteracting
e¤ects of ° on expected returns to a work ethic. For increasing °, the prob-
ability of having a work ethic revealed rises, but the relative return to the
work ethic falls due to H0 (:) · 0: The second e¤ect eventually dominates so
that the higher °; steady state (B) in Figure 1, is the stable one. Finally, Y
must be su¢ciently high in order for …rms to be willing to pay the higher
wage, wn = z ¡ L; that induces both the low and the high ethical types to
provide e¤ort. The proof of the proposition, in the appendix, demonstrates
that the su¢ciency conditions ensure (7) and (6) hold, so that these do not
need to be directly assumed.
The stable steady state B; described in the proposition and depicted
in Figure 1, has the following characteristics: …rms earn positive expected
operating pro…ts from hiring unskilled young workers, some workers are
unemployed when young and these ones remain so when old. All workers
with a work ethic that obtain employment, are employed in the second period
of life as managers, others are unemployed. The movement of individuals is
sketched in Table 1:
Table 1: Steady State B
Birth ability probability Young output Old
good work realized revealed
ethic ! °¤ work ! manager
prob ¯¤
B !!
! 1 ¡ °¤ unemployed ! unemployed
bad work ! ° shirk ! unemployed
ethic !!
prob (1 ¡ ¯¤
B) ! 1 ¡ °¤ unemployed ! unemployed
3.5 Corner Equilibria
We now consider the possibility of steady states occurring at the corners,
¯ =0 ;¯=1 :
Proposition 5 There exists a stable steady state in which ¯ =0 ;°=0 :
17At a corner equilibrium, described by Proposition 5, the non-entry of
…rms, ° =0 ; implies that workers with a good work ethic have no opportu-
nity to reveal it. Consequently none obtain work ethics, ¯ =0 ; but then it
is not viable for …rms to exist. Note that this is a stable steady state: the
introduction of a small number of workers with work ethics will not induce
…rms to enter because, since these workers cannot credibly communicate
their work ethic, any …rms entering would be inundated with applications
from all workers, most of whom are going to shirk.
A steady state at the other corner, ¯ =1 ; is not possible. If all workers
are employed in n …rms then H ! L; Assumption 2 part (i): Thus having a
work ethic yields no bene…t since the amount of rent is H ¡L.I nt h a tc a s e ,
individuals who do not have a work ethic and hence do not incur the …xed
cost, F; will have higher lifetime utility; ¯ will fall.
We now compare society’s welfare in the interior steady state with that
at the no work ethic steady state.
Proposition 6 Social welfare in the interior steady state described in Propo-
sition 4 is strictly higher than social welfare in the steady state described in
Proposition 5.
By necessity, investment in a work ethic is socially e¢cient in an interior
steady state, that is, F is relatively low. The considerable e¢ciency gain to
having individuals with a work ethic thus ensures that even though there
is shirking by some of the young in the interior steady state, infra-marginal
…rms make positive expected pro…ts. There is never shirking in management
because …rms are careful only to hire good workers into management: More-
over, individuals are also better o¤, in expectation, since those with high
ability have a possibility of receiving an ability rent in the interior steady
state.
3.6 Dynamics
Consider the dynamics of this system in (¯;°) space in Figure 2 below.
Note that the phase space for the analysis undergoes a fundamental change
at the point where conditions (7) and (6) bind. The line H = b H,g i v e n
by condition (6), is horizontal since it is una¤ected by ¯; and, conversely,
condition (7) is independent of °: The curve
¢°
¢t =0comprises three parts:
for values of ° above the line H = b H; …rms pay the high wage, w = z ¡ L;
so that the curve in this region is simply given directly from (8): For values
of ° below the line H = b H; …rms pay the low wage, w = z ¡ H (°); so that
the entry condition for …rms is given by
Ei (°)=¯(1 ¡ µ)(Y ¡ z + H (°)) ¡ (1 ¡ ¯ (1¡ µ))z; (11)
which is ‡atter than the part of the curve given by (8); since lowering °
also lowers the wage that needs to be paid through H (°); in addition to
18lowering entry costs through Ei: The third part of the curve is ‡at and this
starts where condition (7) holds at point ¯1:f o rv a l u e so f¯<¯ 1 net pro…ts
in all entering …rms are negative, so none enter.
When both conditions (6) and (7) a r es a t i s … e d ,t h ea n a l y s i si nP r o p o s i -





¢t =0respectively. (Figure 2 depicts only
the stable curve for (9)): The steady state B is locally stable. Furthermore,
given that …rms adjust instantaneously, but workers adjust according to the
replicator dynamic, movement to the steady state from any point in the
region involves a vertical jump to the line
¢°
¢t =0a n dt h e ng r a d u a lc o n v e r -
gence along the arm under the dynamic in (1), as indicated by the heavy
arrows.
At points where either one of conditions (6) or (7) do not hold, indi-
viduals with no work ethic always do better, since when (7) fails, there is
no possibility of being revealed as having a good ethic without …rms, or, if
…rms enter, when (6) fails, the reward to being revealed as having one is too
small. In either of these cases (i.e., in the shaded region in Figure 2)
¢¯
¢t < 0
and continues so until ¯ =0 ;that is, …nal convergence on the steady state
d e s c r i b e di nP r o p o s i t i o n5 ,p o i n tCi nF i g u r e2 .
4 Potentially bene…cial development
Development is a process which is potentially bene…cial. As discussed in the
introduction, we consider development to be improvements in either insti-
tutions or technology that increase productivity but that tend to be ability
intensive. The simplest way of modelling this is as a change which increases
the average productivity of those who are skilled, while leaving una¤ected
the productivity of the unskilled. Further, amongst the skilled, development
increases returns to the H types more than those of the L types. Once again,
a number of changes seem to correspond with this: implementation of new
technologies or work practices, changes in institutions (for example priva-
tization, or allowing more competition in the labour market), or perhaps
o p e n i n gu pt ot r a d e . 22 The crucial feature of this process that we wish to
highlight is the ability intensity of development. Thus we will model these
changes by assuming that development increases returns to the H types
while keeping returns to the L types …xed. Since H (:) is a function we do
this by de…ning a new function corresponding to an upward shift in the pre-
vious one. Formally, we now de…ne H to be also a function of a parameter
q; H (q;°); with Hq (q;°) > 0 for all °<1 and Hq (q;1) = 0 (the latter
constraint serves to preserve part (i) in Assumption 2). Thus, development
22The exact reason is immaterial to the analysis, and all qualitative results are un-
changed provided, for any changes, returns to the high types increase relatively more than
returns to the low.
19in our model is represented by an increase in productivity, measured by
parameter q:
4.1 E¤ects of a productivity increase on welfare
Consider now two di¤erent productivity parameters ql and qh; and let qh >q l
so that the economy with qh has more productive skilled workers. Figure
3 sketches the change arising from a higher q and corresponding increase
in H. First consider equation (9). The left hand side is una¤ected by the
change but the right hand side increases in value, so that the stable steady
state °B is higher. Thus the curve °B or (9) shifts up. In the …gure, all
curves drawn with dashes correspond to values under ql; whereas solid lines
are those under qh: (Note that °A shifts down as well, but this is immaterial
to the analysis and is not depicted.) The curve H = b H (qh) also rises above
H = b H (ql): This upward shift arises because the increase in relative returns
of the H types implies that for …rms to be indi¤erent between targeting
them and the L types, their expected productivity should fall. This will
only occur for ° higher, since dH
d° < 0. A …nal shift is in a segment of
¢°
¢t =0 ; i.e., (8): Note …rstly that this curve does not change for values of
° above those at which H = b H (qh): This is because, at these values, …rms
c h o o s et h eh i g hw a g es t r a t e g y ,w = z ¡ L; so that the change in H does
not a¤ect them. However, at lower values of °; …rms optimally choose the
low wage strategy, w = z ¡H; which has become more pro…table for higher
H: Therefore, in order to preserve the zero expected pro…t condition at the
entry margin, ° must increase, as depicted by the arced arrow, denoting an
upward movement in the part of the curve below H = b H (qh):
By inspection of Figure 3, it can be seen that, in the new steady state,
both ° and ¯ are higher. Intuitively, this is because, with development, the
higher expected productivity, and thus rewards, for those revealed to have
a good work ethic means that evolutionary forces drive more individuals
towards acquiring one, ¯ rises. Therefore, since the population are now
better workers, more …rms are willing to enter. This new steady state,
denoted by D, is also locally stable. Finally, it is also the case that ¯1 falls;
but since this plays no role in the analysis, we consider it no further.
The following proposition characterizes the e¤ect of this productivity
increase on social welfare.
Proposition 7 Let qh >q l: If q increases from ql to qh and the economy
moves from the stable steady state corresponding to ql to the stable steady
state corresponding to qh; social welfare in the economy increases.
Development, if possible, is unambiguously good. By raising returns to
ability, it raises the expected value of a work ethic. In turn, with a better
work ethic in the population, …rms respond by entering which reinforces
20the population’s better work ethic; ¯ rises. Firms’ pro…ts rise because, on
average, fewer workers will shirk. Workers are better o¤ because more can
reap the bene…ts of a good work ethic being revealed.
However, the issue of transition from the low productivity interior steady
state to the development one, i.e., moving from B to D in Figure 3, has not
yet been addressed.
4.2 Development may fail
Economies do not instantaneously jump between steady states. Firms are
relatively ‡uid and can enter quickly to re‡ect the new opportunities. How-
ever, as our earlier discussion emphasized, the population’s work ethic ad-
justs more slowly, a feature we have captured by using a replicator dynamic.
In terms of the model’s dynamics, this means that the model always con-
verges along (8) as discussed in the previous section. This sluggishness in
population adjustment renders the …nal outcome realized far from clear. In
fact, as the following proposition shows, even though development makes a
better steady state possible, such a steady state will not always be attain-
able.
Proposition 8 Suppose that the economy starts in a stable interior equi-
librium (¯¤
B;°¤
B) corresponding to ql: Consider e¢ciency enhancing devel-
opment that increases the productivity parameter to qh >q l; while all other
parameters remain …xed. There exists a 4 > 0 such that if H(qh;°¤
B) ¡
H(ql;°¤
B) > 4, the economy converges monotonically to a steady state in
which: (1) all workers have a bad work ethic, i.e. ¯ =0 ; (2) all …rms shut
down, and (3) no workers are employed.
The proposition says that if the e¤ects of attempted development, rep-
resented by ¢,a r et o ol a r g e ,i tm a yn o tb ep o s s i b l et oa c h i e v et h em o r e
e¢cient interior steady state, D in Figure 3; instead, the economy converges
to an inferior corner equilibrium in which initially existing work ethics are
destroyed; C in Figure 3.
Consider the dynamics of this situation graphically, in Figure 4. As
depicted, the rise in equation (6) to the new H = b H (qh) has moved it
above the original equilibrium value of °; denoted °¤: This is the critical
condition for development to fail. With ¯ starting at point ¯¤ maginal
…rms, at the old level of °; strictly prefer to enter, re‡ecting the higher
productivity of H; and they do so up until the point denoted °1 in the
…gure. This is the upward arrow from point B in Figure 4. But as the point
(°1;¯¤) is below H = b H (qh); all …rms now strictly prefer the low wage
strategy. This is because high ability individuals have experienced a relative
increase in returns, and it now becomes optimal for …rms to target these
individuals when setting wages. An implication of this is that not even high
21ability workers can receive ability rents so that evolutionary incentives force
a decline in work ethics. In the next period then, the economy has even
fewer ethical workers (¯ falls), which leads to an increase in °; so that the
economy traverses along the arm of
¢°
¢t (qh)=0in the South-West direction
in Figure 4: This arm then monotonically converges to the zero work ethic
steady state, point C, and development fails. Note that this would not have
happened if ¯ could somehow increase directly to its new interior steady
state level depicted at point D: This is because, at point D; ¯ is high enough
for the relative di¤erence between the low and high ability’s returns to be
small, so that …rms choose to continue with the high wage strategy.
Intuitively, although e¢ciency enhancing, development improves pro-
ductivity and rewards ability unequally - those with low ability see little
(actually no change in our experiment) in productivity and rewards, while
the productivity and rewards of those with high ability increase. This in-
creases the rent of high ability individuals. If the …rms choose so, they can
s e tt h ew a g e st h e yo ¤ e rs oa st oe x t r a c tt h i sr e n t . I ft h i si sd o n e ,i . e . i f
H = b H (qh) rises too much, then not even high ability individuals can re-
ceive a life-time rent on their ability, and hence on their work ethic. Thus,
all individuals are better o¤ not developing a work ethic. However, if this
occurs, the economy can only eventually converge on point C:
The very capacity of high ability individuals to obtain rents to their
ability depends on …rms’ desire to keep including low ability individuals in
production. If …rms decide the low ability are not worth inducing to work,
then …rms can set wages so as to just make the high ability indi¤erent to
working, thereby ensuring ethical types receive no rents. Since the critical
condition determining whether development will fail is whether …rms con-
tinue to include the low ability types, the model suggests the importance
of a development process which is inclusive, in the sense of maintaining
production incentives, even for the low ability.
Another implication of this is that development which is not ability in-
tensive will surely succeed. If L were to increase by more than H; …rms
would have even stronger incentives to pay the high wage, and evolutionary
incentives would persist in transition to the better steady state.23
In summary, though the productivity improvements accompanying the
attempt at “development” create the possibility of a better equilibrium, the
equilibrium cannot be reached starting from the economy’s old equilibrium.
Moreover, not only can the new one not be reached, but the favourable
characteristics of the pre-development economy: some …rms entering, some
workers with work ethics, and some managers being trained, are also lost.
The economy converges uniquely to the bad corner equilibrium C:
23In terms of …gure 3, the dashed curve H = b H; shifts downward instead of up, so that
transition from the pre-development steady state to the development interior steady state
is ensured.
224.3 Gradual development
Suppose now the productivity changes occur gradually. This more closely
corresponds to the emergence of such technologies and institutions in the
West.24 Here we model this as corresponding to a number of convex com-
binations of the dramatic increase in the productivity parameter, qh ¡ ql;
considered previously. Gradual development is a sequence of K technology
or organizational changes, K>1; such that in change k; k =1 ;2;:::;K;
the productivity parameter q increases from qk¡1 to qk,w h e r eq0 = ql and
qK = qh: Suppose also that after each of these steps is implemented the
economy is given enough time to converge to the new steady state before
the next step is undertaken. This will be referred to as a gradualization K
of development. The next proposition shows that sequenced changes allow
the undesirable outcome of Proposition 8 to be avoided:
Proposition 9 Suppose that the economy starts in a stable interior equilib-
rium (¯¤;°¤) corresponding to ql: Consider an e¢ciency enhancing change
that increases the productivity parameter to qh >q l: There exists a gradu-
alization K of this change that ensures a unique path of development that
converges on the superior interior equilibrium.
Intuitively, developing gradually, by a series of small changes, allows
the population’s work ethic to keep pace with the development process.
The incentives to acquire a work ethic depend on wages paid by …rms that
encourage a good work ethic, which in turn depend on the magnitude of
rents enjoyed by high ability ethical types. Gradualization of development
ensures these rents do not become so high as to tempt the …rms to lower
their wages, which would destroy any evolutionary incentives to acquire a
work ethic.
Gradualization of development is not the only way to ensure convergence
to the development steady state. In general, dramatic changes can still be
implemented provided the dispersion in returns to the H and L types is
limited. If earned income is observable and taxable, increased dispersion
can be o¤set by increasing progressivity in the tax and transfer system,
…rms will persist with the high wage strategy, which preserves evolutionary
incentives for a work ethic, causing development to succeed.
While we concede that our model is too stylized to generate uncondi-
tional policy recommendations, it is noteworthy that the prominent devel-
opment success stories of the Asia Paci…c all started with tightly compressed
earnings distributions, comparable to OECD and high income countries,
that remained stable over the periods of high per capita income growth
24Dramatic change did occur there too, but even large technological innovations are
not likely to have presented as profound a change as the introduction of centuries of
accumulated know-how in the largely agrarian economies of contemporary LDCs.
23(in the range of 5% for the region as a whole) from the early 60s to the
90s. Comparison with the world’s low growth regions over the same period,
Latin America (approximately 1.5% per capita income growth), and Sub-
Saharan Africa, (less than 1% per capita income growth) are consistent with
the model.25 Both of these regions had signi…cantly more dispersed income
distributions than the Asia Paci…c (Gini coe¢cients in the 50’s and 40’s
respectively, compared with the mid 30’s for the Asia Paci…c, see Deininger
and Squire (1998)), and grew much more slowly. This negative impact of
inequality on growth is already well known and has spawned a considerable
literature to explain it. Our model, provides another reason to expect such
a link and further relates it to the population’s work ethic. At this point it
should be useful to examine the considerable body of empirical work con-
ducted by sociologists on societies’ work ethics, and see if these correlate
with the growth/inequality measures that are well known to be correlated
together.26 Unfortunately, relatively few of these psychometric studies have
been performed for LDCs, furthermore, it is well recognized in the psychome-
tric literature that the surveys on which work ethics measures are estimated
are not comparable across countries, nor usually even across studies, (see
Furnham 1990, Ch. 4). Such comparisons will not be instructive until more
careful cross-country studies are available.27
5 Robustness and conclusions
Much of the model’s structure could be generalized while preserving the
main results. Our aim has not been to provide the most general treatment,
nor the most realistic model of LDC labour markets, but rather to construct
as simple a framework as possible to examine the critical forces at play in
our argument. Here we discuss these.
The inability of …rms to fully control all elements of the production
relationship, either by a complete contract or supervision, ensured work
ethics could have a socially bene…cial role in our model. The precise way we
modelled this was by assuming that contracts were limited to specifying non-
negative payments for workers, i.e. limited worker liability. This ensured
that shirking was costly to the …rm, since it was not able to recoup all losses
via a penalty payment from workers. Under the accompanying assumption
that such shirking was bene…cial to workers (the term z) this meant …rms
25The precise …gures vary depending on precise start and end dates and the countries
de…ned in a region, but are always close to these approximations.
26Jones (1997)provides a recent surveys of this psychometric literature.
27We were not able to …nd studies directly comparing work ethics in low and high growth
LDCs that controlled for di¤erences in age and socio-economic status of those surveyed.
Recent cross-country comparisons with better controls are being attempted, for example
a cross-country comparison between Australia and Sri-Lanka by Niles (1999) analyzes
representative samples of the two populations.
24were concerned about the possibility of shirking, and work ethics played a
role. If, instead, we had assumed perfect and complete contracting, a work
ethic would have evolved into the population whenever its value in lowering
the disutility of work were su¢ciently high, and the present paper’s concerns
would not arise. Thus, workers’ shirking being costly to …rms is clearly a
crucial ingredient of our model. However, that this arises through limited
worker liability is not.
Another crucial ingredient was the existence of di¤ering ability types in
the population. This ensured that when …rms found it optimal to provide
performance incentives for those with low ability, the high type received an
informational rent that was critical in maintaining evolutionary incentives
for development of a work ethic. This basic e¤ect would persist in a model
with more than two types, and where …rms were not able to extract all of
t h er e n t so fu n s k i l l e dw o r k e r s . I ns u c haw o r l d ,t h er e n t se n j o y e db yh i g h
ability types would fall as some of the lower ability types were ignored by
…rms, but perhaps not disappear altogether. As long as they fell, the same
dilution of evolutionary incentives for provision of a work ethic as considered
in the paper would occur, but would simply be less stark.
We couched our analysis of work ethics in an explicitly evolutionary
environment because we believed that to provide a realistic framework for
thinking about cultural variables. However, evolutionary environments are
often criticized for their lack of individual rationality, a feature which is
also evident here when the economy is transitioning to a steady state. It
should be noted, however, that the evolutionary framework is not strictly
necessary for our main results. It is possible to instead model the work
ethic choice as being undertaken by fully rational agents. The critical factor
is that, at the aggregate level, changes in work ethics should occur slowly
(relative to …rms’ mode changes). This is, of course, a feature of replicator
based evolutionary models, but not exclusively so. A non-evolutionary based
reason for such slow changes in aggregate could be, for example, randomly
realized heterogeneous costs of individual adjustment, or variations due to
di¤erences in age. Provided this feature of di¤erences in speed of adjustment
is preserved, the main concerns raised in this paper will still arise, since, once
again, economies will not be able to instantly jump to the better steady state.
The one other formal paper directly concerned with work ethics we are
aware of is by Congleton (1991). He showed that such a trait could be valu-
able in a number of situations where labour markets are not perfect. A more
closely related paper on “managerial ethics” was due to Noe and Rebello
(1994). There, ethical managers could be trusted to apply appropriate ef-
fort even when …nancial incentives were not su¢ciently strong to mitigate
agency problems. They also similarly considered how production choices
varied with aggregate ethic levels, and, in turn, how ethic levels a¤ected
returns to previous levels of ethics. They modelled choices of managerial
ethics in a richer way than we have here by explicitly considering the e¤ects
25of parental socialization; considerations that we have buried in our repli-
cator dynamic. A principal di¤erence, however, is that there are no …rms
(or any other such similar mechanism) which allow ethic revelation in their
framework. In fact, ethical agents in their model could never obtain an eco-
nomic reward to this characteristic and were, at best, just as well o¤ as the
non-ethical. Whereas in our model there is a positive dependence between
ethic development and …rms, leading to the possibility of both ethical and
non-ethical steady states, in their model the dependence was negative; the
higher the level of economic activity the greater the losses incurred by ethi-
cal managers. Ethical types could still stabilize at a non-zero level in their
model, but this was because both ethical and unethical parents had positive
chances of producing ethical o¤spring, even though these su¤ered lifetime
losses. Di¤erent parameterizations of transition functions thus lead to either
stable managerial ethical levels or cyclical ones, which they used to explain
their main focus, i.e., the dependence of economic activity on ethics levels.
In addition to the positive dependence between …rms and work ethics, our
paper also has an entirely di¤erent focus to theirs. Our focus has been on
the dynamics of adjustment to positive shocks, where this type of positive
shock is a metaphor for the economy’s attempt at “development”. We have
thus abstracted from the richness of transition functions underlying work
ethics, since these play no interesting role in such adjustment, and focused
instead on a possible symbiosis between work ethics and the …rms which
depend on them.
Though structurally di¤erent, the model bears a closer conceptual re-
semblance to a recent model by Cozzi (1998). He similarly dealt with the
inappropriability of returns to a characteristic that was productivity enhanc-
ing which he called “culture”. In his model, culture was a costly to acquire
trait that was useful in production and was transmitted from the old to the
young by explicit learning. This broad de…nition of the word culture could
admit an interpretation along the lines of a work ethic, as we have de…ned it
here. He showed that, even without a direct reward to culture in production,
it could persist in steady state if people paid to acquire it in anticipation of
payment for training the next generation when they themselves became old.
Culture thus persisted as an asset whose value was positive as part of a ra-
tional bubble. Here, in contrast, with enough …rms entering, individuals can
bene…t directly from their investment in a work ethic. Unlike Cozzi we do
not allow for individuals to bene…t by selling this skill to future generations
so that the returns to a work ethic, in our model, depend exclusively on the
possibility of an informational rent to the high ability that is obtained when
…rms want to induce e¤ort from the low ability too. This is what causes the
potentially negative impact of productivity enhancing changes, since these
can lead …rms to give up on inducing e¤ort from the low ability altogether.
The paper has two positive implications. Firstly, it provides a reason
for why the plight of currently developing countries may be di¤erent from
26that of Western countries at their own early stages of development. In the
West, continued productivity growth, occurring gradually over a number of
centuries, encouraged development of the right sort of work attitudes be-
cause, by its very nature, it was gradual. However, follower countries that
are attempting to develop by the implementation of e¢ciency enhancing
Western type technologies or institutions, are attempting a much more dra-
matic change which as the model shows may not succeed when gradual ones
do. Secondly, it explains why even dramatic changes may succeed provided
they do not lead to too large an increase in relative returns of those who are
already relatively highly rewarded. A development process in which rela-
tive returns of the high ability do not dramatically outstrip the low is more
likely to be a success. The model thus provides another explanation for the
relative growth success of countries that were able to maintain compressed
earnings distributions.
6A p p e n d i x
Proof of Lemma 1:
(ii) Suppose a …rm decides to assign to management a worker whom it
believes has a good work ethic with probability less than 1. The …rm would
never do this unless it provides this manager with incentives not to shirk.
That is, it must o¤er a wage wm for high output such that wm ¸ " + ±
(otherwise the worker will shirk if he has bad work ethic). But, Assumption
3, part (ii), implies that " + ±>H (°) for any °: Hence, in this case wm >
H(°); which means that the …rm earns negative expected pro…t. It will
therefore never assign to management a worker about whose work ethic it
is not sure.
(i) Now suppose a worker was revealed as having good work ethic. Then
she will provide e¤ort when assigned to management as long as wm ¸ ":
Since "<Lthis can be easily satis…ed. Competition for these workers will
then lead the …rms to bid their wages up to L and H; depending on the
ability.¥
Proof of Lemma 2:
(i) To prove this claim, look at an individual with no work ethic employed
in a …rm. Suppose the wage this …rm pays is w
0
: Then if this individual
provides e¤ort, her lifetime utility is w
0
¡ ± + "; because when old she will
be assigned to management and then shirk (this follows from the argument
in the proof of part (ii) in Lemma 1 above). If she shirks, in contrast, her
payo¤ is z: Thus, the worker will provide e¤ort only if w
0
¸ ± +z¡"; which
f r o mp a r t( i i )i nA s s u m p t i o n3i m p l i e sw
0
>Y :The …rm will therefore never
o¤er this wage, which means that a worker without good work ethic will
always shirk when employed.
Part (ii) is immediate.¥
27Proof of Lemma 3:
According to the proof of Lemma 2, a …rm will never want to elicit e¤ort
from a worker with bad work ethic. The wage in these …rms is therefore
determined so as to provide incentives to workers with a good work ethic.
The utility to a job for a high type with a work ethic who does not shirk
is w + H (°); since the worker receives payments w and then H (°) as a
manager (Lemma 2): If this worker shirks, he receives z only, so that a wage
of w = z ¡ H (°) just induces an H worker with a work ethic not to shirk.
Correspondingly a higher wage of w = z ¡L induces both the high and the
low types who have a work ethic not to shirk. The individuals without a
work ethic, who are proportion (1 ¡ ¯) of the labor force, will always take a
job and shirk. Thus the expected pro…t from the high wage strategy exceeds
that from the low if and only if:
¯(Y ¡ z + L) ¡ (1 ¡ ¯)z ¸ ¯(1 ¡ µ)(Y ¡ z + H (°)) ¡ (1 ¡ ¯ (1 ¡ µ))z:
This rearranges to the condition in the lemma.¥
Proof of Proposition 4:
(i) We …rst show that if an interior equilibrium exists, it solves conditions
(8) to (10): In an interior equilibrium, the expected utility of individuals
with good or bad work ethics must be equal, and …rms hiring the young
must make non-negative pro…t at the equilibrium values of ¯ and °: If not,
then either ¯ and/or ° will change from their conjectured equilibrium values.
Both shirkers and non-shirkers strictly prefer to obtain work when young.
The shirkers, because they can cheat and obtain the positive amount z
without e¤ort, and the non-shirkers because, by working at one of these …rms
and not shirking they obtain w; are revealed to have a good work ethic, and
receive payment as a manager which is commensurate with their abilities; H
or L for a low type. If an equilibrium has ° …rms hiring, the probability of
an individual receiving one of these jobs when young is °<1; because these
jobs are assumed to be rationed randomly. Reciprocally, measure 1 ¡ ° of
the young who do not obtain work are unemployed.
Thedynamic governing an individual’s work ethic conditions on expected
ability, the µ distribution: In an interior equilibrium, condition (6) must
hold (otherwise the wage would equal z ¡ H (°) and any individual with a
work ethic would do strictly worse than one without one, so that ¯ would
converge to zero). Thus, an individual with a work ethic has expected utility
¡F +°[(1¡µ)(H (°)¡L)+z]+(1¡ °)(0): If one has a bad work ethic the
expected utility is (1 ¡ °)(0)+°z;since this individual will shirk: Combining
these yields a condition that is necessary for a positive proportion of each
type in steady state:
°z = ¡F + °[(1 ¡ µ)(H (°) ¡ L)+z]: (12)
28Rearranging, we obtain the condition (9) in the proposition.
Next consider the pro…ts of …rms using each type of production. Given
a measure of good workers, ¯; the expected pro…t of a …rm is ¯(Y ¡ w) ¡
(1¡ ¯)z; which from Lemma 3 implies that ¼ = ¯(Y + L) ¡ z if condition
(6) holds. Thus there is entry up until:
Ei = ¯(Y + L) ¡ z; (13)
which is condition (8) from the proposition. For (12) and (13) to be consis-





which is condition (10) in the proposition. For simplicity we can denote the
function Ei(°) as the value of E corresponding to a particular value of ° in
the distribution. Clearly, this function is increasing.
(ii) Figure 1 plots equations (8) and (9) in (¯;°) space. Consider equa-
tion (9) …rst.
Step 1. Existence of a solution to equation (9):
B o t ht h er i g h th a n ds i d e( R H S )a n dt h el e f th a n ds i d e( L H S )o ft h i s
equation are plotted in Fig. A1. It is easy to check that parts (ii) and (iii)
of Assumption 2 imply that RHS is concave in °. At the same time, when
° =0RHS is equal to zero and increasing in °; where the latter follows
from parts (i) and (ii) of Assumption 2. Finally, when ° =1then RHS < 0;
which follows from H (1) = L (part (i) of Assumption 2). Thus, there exists
a ^ ° 2 (0;1) such that RHS increases in ° if °<^ °, decreases if °>^ ° and
reaches a maximum when ° =^ °; while RHS(^ °) > 0:
Therefore, if F>F ¤ ´ RHS(^ °) then (9) has no solution and claim (a)
follows. If F = F¤ then (9) has exactly one solution, ° 2 (0;1): If F<F ¤
then (9) has exactly two solutions, °A and °B; both from (0;1); this case is
depicted in Figure A1. Note that (9), and therefore also °; °A and °B; are
independent of ¯; so that °A and °B are represented as horizontal lines in
Figure 1.
Step 2. Existence of an interior solution to the system of equations (9)
and (8). Suppose F<F ¤ (when F = F¤ the proof is similar). From
Step 1 above we know that (8) has exactly two solutions °A and °B that
are between 0 and 1: Now look at equation (8): Solving for ¯ we obtain
¯(°)=
Ei(°)+z








where the inequality follows since E0
i(:) is an increasing function. Thus the
function ¯(°) is upward sloping, as depicted in Figure 1: Because ¯(°) is
29always between 0 and 1 (from Assumption 1, parts (ii) and (iii)), there
exist ¯A and ¯B from (0;1) such that ¯A = ¯(°A) and ¯B = ¯(°B): By
monotonicity, ¯A and ¯B are unique and (8) and (9)haveexactlytwo interior
solutions.
Step 3. ¯A and ¯B obtained in the previous step satisfy conditions (6)
and (7): Condition (6) holds for any ^ °n that satis…es (9) if Y ¤(F) is chosen
so that H(^ °) ·
µY ¤(F)+L
1¡µ :Y ¤(:) is a function of F because ^ ° is a function






Y +L = ¯1,for i= A or B:
Step 4. Stability. Suppose …rst that F<F ¤: Suppose also that ¯¤
A <¯ ¤
B
(this can be assumed without loss of generality). By comparing expected
utilities of workers with and without a work ethic we …nd that the expected
utility of individuals with a work ethic is higher if and only if
F<°(1 ¡ µ)(H (°) ¡ L): (14)
Because of the concavity of the RHS, this holds if and only if ° 2 (°¤
A;°¤
B);
thus, if ° 2 (°¤
A;°¤
B) the number of individuals with a work ethic, ¯; tends
to increase, otherwise it tends to decrease.
Similarly, the number of …rms entering;° ;rises i¤ the expected pro…t of
these …rms is larger than the entry costs:
E(°) <¯(Y + L)¡ z: (15)
This is true i¤ ¯>¯ (°):
Look at equilibrium A and suppose that ° increases slightly above °¤
A:
Then (14) holds, which implies that ¯ increases, which in turn implies the
inequality in condition (15) holds; so that ° rises further, and so on. Equi-
librium A is therefore unstable.
Now consider equilibrium B:Suppose° increases slightly above °¤
B: Then
the opposite of (14) holds and ¯ tends to decrease below ¯¤
B. But then this
means that the opposite of (15) holds so that ° decreases back to °¤
B: The
opposite happens when we consider a slight decrease of ° below °¤
B: Similarly,
if ¯ deviates below ¯¤
B; t h eo p p o s i t eo f(15) holds so that ° starts decreasing
below °¤
B; w h i c hi nt u r ni m p l i e st h a t(14) holds and ¯ rises back towards
¯¤
B: The opposite happens when ¯ deviates slightly above ¯¤
B:
The instability of the unique equilibrium of part (b) follows immediately
from the fact that the reverse of (14) holds for all ° 6= °¤; so that ¯ has a
tendency to decrease whenever ¯ 6= ¯¤.¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 :Suppose no individuals have a good work
ethic, ¯ =0 . Then the pro…ts from entry are strictly negative for all …rms,
from (4). Thus, from (2) ° =0 . Furthermore, since there are no …rms, no
young workers are revealed as having work ethics and consequently returns
to nature choosing a good work ethic are strictly less than the returns to a
bad one, so that evolutionary forces drive ¯ =0 . ¥
30Proof of Proposition 6:
Compare …rms’ expected pro…ts in each steady state. In the corner
steady state, …rms do not exist. In the interior steady state, infra-marginal
…rms earn positive expected pro…ts: Now consider individuals. In the corner
steady state, all individuals have expected utility equal to zero. In the
interior steady state individuals with a good work ethic must have equal




Thus, consider the expected utility of individuals with bad work ethics.
Since, such individuals have a positive probability of obtaining work, where
they will shirk and obtain z, their expected utility is °z > 0: Thus these
individuals are strictly better o¤ in the interior steady state, as are, in
expectation, individuals who have a work ethic. Thus economy wide welfare
is higher in the interior steady state.¥
Proof of Proposition 7: Look at the expected utility of workers in
steady state, W(q); in the economy for a given q:
W(q)=¯°[w + µL +( 1¡ µ)H(q;°) ¡ F]+( 1¡ ¯)[°z]:
The …rst term re‡ects the fact that only individuals with a work ethic work
when young are employed. These individuals are then revealed as having a
work ethic and are assigned to management; where their output depends on
their ability. The last term captures the fact that individuals without a work
e t h i ct a k eaj o ba n ds h i r k .N o wc o n s i d e rt w ov a l u e sf o rq; ql <q h; and their
corresponding steady states, denoted with l and h subscripts respectively.
In these it is the case that: ¯h >¯ l and °h >° l: In any steady state,
by evolutionary pressures it must be the case that the two terms in square
brackets in W (qh) are equalized. But since °h >° l then W (qh) >W(ql):
So workers have higher expected utility in steady state with higher q: Firms
have higher expected pro…ts as a whole since °h >° l implies that there are
more infra-marginal …rms earning positive pro…t.¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n8 : Consider an initial interior steady state
(¯¤
B;°¤
B) corresponding to the productivity parameter ql: At this steady
state, condition (6) must hold, i.e. H(ql;°¤
B) · ^ H: Let 4 = ^ H ¡ H(ql;°¤
B)




B)+4: Since condition (8), determining equilibrium lev-
els of °; is independent of H; provided (6) continues to hold the numbers of
…rms ° does not react to this productivity increase immediately; rather, they
adjust slowly with ¯; which follows a gradual replicator dynamic. Therefore,
the economy moves away from the initial equilibrium B slowly and contin-
uously. Meanwhile, a sudden increase in H by H(qh;°¤) ¡ H(ql;°¤) > 4
causes a discrete jump in H(:;°¤
B); to H(qh;°¤
B); so that
^ H ¡ H(qh;°n¤
B ) < ^ H ¡ H(ql;°n¤
B ) ¡4=0 ;
31where the inequality follows from H(qh;°n¤
B ) >H (ql;°n¤
B )+4: This obvi-
ously violates condition (6): The number of workers with ethic therefore
gradually starts to decrease and the economy monotonically converges to
the ¯ =0steady state as described in the dynamics section above:¥






be the stable interior equi-
librium corresponding to tk¡1;k=1 ;2;:::;K: De…ne 4(qk¡1) as 4(qk¡1) ´
^ H¡H(qk¡1;°¤
k¡1) and choose the gradualization 1;2;:::;Ksothat H(qk;°¤
k¡1) <
H(qk¡1;°¤
k¡1)+4(qk¡1): By continuity of H(:;:); it is always possible to
…nd a …nite K such that this holds for all k · K: In each of these K the
increase in q causes …rst a discrete jump in H(:;:) from H(qk¡1;°¤
k¡1) to
H(qk;°¤
k¡1) and then a gradual decrease from H(qk;°¤
k¡1) to H(qk;°¤
k) as °
slowly increases with ¯: Moreover, H(qk;°¤
k) <H (qk¡1;°¤
k¡1); which follows
from condition (9) and from °¤
k >° ¤







to an interior stable steady state (¯¤
k;°¤
k)
can occur only if condition (6) holds for ¯1(qk;°¤
k¡1) and ¯¤
k¡1; because ¯¤
adjusts slowly. But it holds because
^ H ¡ H(qk;°¤
k) > ^ H ¡ H(qk;°¤
k¡1) > ^ H ¡ H(qk¡1;°¤
k¡1)¡4 (qk¡1)=0 ;
where the …rst inequality follows from °¤
k >° ¤




Thus, if enough time is allowed for ¯ to adjust in every step, condition
(6) can remain satis…ed, and the economy can gradually move from the
interior stable steady state corresponding to ql to the interior stable steady
state corresponding to qh. ¥
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